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Résumé 
Cet article examine les quatre sortes d’idoles qui selon le Novum Organon de Bacon 
(1620) affectent l’esprit humain. Il s’agit des idoles de la Tribu – qui résultent de la 
croyance «que le sens humain est la mesure des choses» ; des idoles de la caverne 
– qui sont propres à chacun de nous ; des idoles du forum – «qui prennent naissan-
ce dans le commerce et la communauté des hommes», et des idoles du théâtre – 
«introduites dans l’esprit par les divers systèmes des philosophes et les mauvaises 
méthodes de démonstration». Nous examinons si ces idoles sont toujours présen-
tes dans les sciences sociales contemporaines, et examinons plusieurs exemples af-
fectant la démographie – la génétique du comportement, la théorie postmoderne, 
l’héréditarisme et l’herméneutique moderne. L’analyse de ces exemples suggère 
fortement que la démographie doit rester fidèle à la méthode scientifique lors-
qu’elle recourt à de nouvelles approches et inspirations. 
Mots-clés 
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Summary 
In this paper, we examine the four Idols that beset human minds according to Fran-
cis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620). These are: Idols of the Tribe – false assertions 
resulting from the belief that «the sense of man is the measure of things»; Idols of 
the Cave – peculiar to the individual people; Idols of the Market Place – resulting 
from «the intercourse and association of men with each other», and Idols of the 
Theatre – stemming from «dogmas of philosophies and… wrong laws of demon-
stration». We aim to see if these Idols are still alive in contemporary population 
sciences, and look at several examples from the fringes of demography – behaviour 
genetics, postmodern theory, hereditarianism, and modern hermeneutics. The ana-
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lysis of these examples strongly suggests that demography needs to remain faithful 
to the scientific method whilst looking for new insights and inspirations. 
Key words 
Epistemology, demography, social sciences, genetics, methods. 
Introduction 
Francis Bacon wrote the Novum Organum (1620) in order to elaborate 
an inductive method in opposition to the Organon, the name given by 
Aristotle’s disciples to the set of his six works on logic. He contrasted his 
new approach to the standard one at the time, saying: 
«There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. 
The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and 
from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, 
proceeds to judgement and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is 
now in fashion. The other derives from the senses and particulars, rising by a 
gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last 
of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried» (Book One, XIX). 
During the 17th century, this new, inductive, way of inference was fol-
lowed as well in the natural sciences: in astronomy in Newton’s volume 
on Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (1687)4, in the theory 
of probability by Pascal (1654)5, mainly applied during this century to 
games or population sciences, and by Graunt in population sciences, 
with his Bills on Mortality (1662)6. We must say here how his notion of 
induction was different from the version that is familiar to us nowadays. 
This method consists of discovering the principles of natural or social 
properties by way of experimentation and observation, in the sense that 
without these principles the properties observed would be different 
(Franck, 2002). In contrast Mill (1843) and his followers consider under 
this term only the generalization from particular facts, which is entirely 
different. 
The first way was more precisely characterized by Bacon through the 
metaphors of the four Idols which he called: Idols of the Tribe; Idols of 
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the Cave; Idols of the Market Place; and Idols of the Theatre. His book ga-
ve many examples of these four kinds of Idols, so that they may be clear-
ly understood. 
We have already shown how during the following centuries, paradigm 
change in demography was largely in the line of Bacon’s second way 
(Courgeau, 2012; Bijak et al., 2014) and we think that his inductive ap-
proach is still the best way to achieve the objectives of population sci-
ences. This is why now, over 350 years after Graunt’s seminal work, we 
would like to examine if the first way is still followed in some particular 
areas of demography and to show what particular interests and aims 
may be involved. 
This paper is a critical essay and should be treated as such. The main 
motivation behind it consists in the presence of epistemological prob-
lems at the fringes of contemporary population studies. Hence, in this 
paper we will examine each of the Idols and try to see if they are still ali-
ve in the context of demography, and if so, what form they may take cur-
rently. However, for the sake of the transparency of presentation, we 
will not present here an exhaustive view of such ideologies, but only so-
me illustrative examples of their use. The choice of examples is necessa-
rily subjective, but we hope that they will nonetheless help illuminate 
some of the challenges facing the 21st century demography, increase 
self-awareness of our discipline, and help avoid some of the Idols in the 
future. 
Idols of the Tribe (Idola tribus) 
Let us see how Bacon characterized these first Idols. In Bacon’s view, 
they rest upon the «false assertion that the sense of man is the measure 
of things» (Book One, XLI): 
«The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence 
of more order and regularity in the world that it finds. And though there may be 
many things in nature which are singular and unmatched, yet he devises for 
them parallels and conjugates and relatives which do not exist» (Book One, 
XLV). 
He gave for natural sciences the example of the «fiction that all celestial 
bodies move in perfect circles» (idem) and for social sciences the exam-
ple of astrology, which is always followed by many men but no longer 
considered a scientific matter. 
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For social sciences these idols are more precisely what the perceptions 
of our mind permit us to think. Every person knows what a birth is, or a 
death or a move in space – but it is more difficult to understand what lay 
behind these concepts of fertility, mortality and migration, which form 
the basis of population sciences. However, these individual events, 
which are universally human, may prevent any scientific thinking about 
them. When they appear today in the press, the media, etc., they are 
mainly being considered as personal events, and not as occurring to a 
statistical individual. Such events, often selected for their uniqueness 
and for how strongly they impact on the minds of the readers or view-
ers, are not representative of the processes that underlie them. 
We will give now another recent example: behavioural genetics (or: be-
haviour genetics), used by a number of researchers who publish papers 
on this topic in major demographic journals (Morgan, King, 2001; Rodg-
ers et al., 2001a; Miller et al., 2010). It is also used in a great number of 
social sciences, such as educational science, medicine, physiology, psy-
chiatry, psychology, sociology, etc. (Plomin et al., 2012). These research-
ers use this method to study not only demographic traits, such as fertili-
ty, partnership formation, longevity, infant and childhood mortality, di-
vorce, etc., but also every kind of human trait, such as intelligence, per-
sonality, smoking, homosexuality, femininity, obesity, aggression, etc. 
The two central points of these studies are (1) the claim that there is a 
genetic component in behavioural traits, and (2) that the contribution of 
this component to the variance of the traits in the population can be 
measured (Vetta, Courgeau, 2003, p. 402). 
The answer to the first point could be «yes», as it might be possible to 
find some genetic background for any human characteristic. To answer 
the second point, however, we have to see if it is possible to split up an 
observed behaviour into a genetic component and an environmental 
one. We will show here how such an approach, which goes back to what 
was called «biometry» in the work of Galton (1865), is devising, in the 
words of Bacon, «parallels, conjugates and relatives which do not exist» 
(idem). Let us see in more detail the hypotheses on which it is based. 
First, it is based on assumptions made a long time ago by Fisher (1918). 
They can be given, under more contemporary terms, as follows: there 
exist polygenes, that (i) act positively, (ii) segregate independently and 
(iii) whose number may be considered as infinite; next, (iv) the environ-
ment is independent of genes and random, and (v) the population is in 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, e.g. there are no changes in gene or geno-
type frequencies from one generation to the next (Vetta, Courgeau, 
2003, p. 405). With these assumptions Fisher was able to give an addi-
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tive decomposition of the variance of a given trait into different genetic 
effects (for more details, see Visscher et al., 2008). Notably, as we dis-
cuss later, Vetta (1976) has shown Fisher’s formulae to be incorrect. 
Also, it is based on the concept of heritability, due to Lush (1936), who 
devised it based on the experiments on plants, even though himself was 
concerned that the concept may be misused7. Formally, the heritability 
of a trait within a population is «a ratio of variances, specifically as the 
proportion of total variance in a population for a particular measure-
ment, taken at a particular time or age that is attributable to variation in 
additive genetic or total genetic values» (Visscher et al., 2008, p. 255). 
The latter is usually referred to as «heritability in the broad sense», and 
denoted by H2, whereas the former is labelled as «heritability in the nar-
row sense», and denoted by h2 (idem). 
At this time these concepts were used by animal and plant breeders, and 
behaviour genetics began to be used to study human behavioural traits, 
particularly twin studies at the beginning of the seventies, with the work 
of Jinks and Fulker (1970). They used Fisher’s formulae – the incorrect 
one – to show that, even if there is a dependence and interaction be-
tween phenotypic and environment variances, it is always possible to 
consider the effect of genes and the effect of environment separately in 
an additive model. 
However, these assumptions (axioms) were not obtained through a sys-
tematic observation of certain properties of genes, as at this time there 
was no possible way to verify their truth, but they were mainly counter-
factual ones, too quickly drawn from some existing statistics and after-
wards considered settled truths. 
Later, we see that with the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA 
by Watson and Crick in 1953 and the analysis of the human genome 
with only 20’774 protein-coding genes8, the hypothesis of a very great 
number of polygenes for a given trait may no longer be tenable: given 
the vast number of proteins in the human body, the DNA alone cannot 
provide a blueprint for their structure. Also, as all genes on a chromoso-
me segregate together, the hypothesis that genes segregate indepen-
dently is not correct and the additivity of effects is destroyed. 
We can also show that the hypothesis relating to the additivity of gene 
and environment has no scientific content, and that Hardy-Weinberg 
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equilibrium for humans has no reason to be verified, as it means that 
there are no migrations, no assortative mating, no mutation nor selec-
tion of any type. Finally, Vetta (1976) showed that Fisher’s (1918) kin-
ship correlation formulae under non-random, assortative mating are 
wrong and that some formulae of Jinks and Fulker (1970) are also 
wrong, making their method useless. For a more detailed demonstration 
of all these incorrect assumptions you can see in the social sciences: 
Sarkar (1998), Capron, Vetta (2001), Gottlieb (2001), etc. and in de-
mography more particularly: Vetta, Courgeau (2003), Courgeau, Vetta 
(2006), etc. As Gottlieb (2001) said: 
«It is now known that both genes and environment are involved in all traits and 
that it is not possible to specify their respective weighting or quantitative influ-
ence on any trait. […] this has been a hard-won scientific insight that had not 
yet percolated to the mass of humanity» (p. 6’121). 
We can also conclude that the use of the concept of heritability linked to 
Fisher’s assumptions leads to a dead end (Jacquard, 1983). 
However the behavioural geneticists remained silent about these criti-
cisms and continued making these same errors – even the entrance into 
the genomic era did not reduce their audience. Rodgers et al. (2001b) 
wrote about human fertility: 
«In the future, the important theoretical questions in this arena may well 
emerge from the human genome project» (p. 187). 
Again many studies were published during the last years using classical 
twin studies9 and genomic methods simultaneously (Van Dongen et al., 
2012). 
For example, genome-wide association studies (GWASs), that define ge-
nomic regions associated with some traits or complex diseases, have du-
ring the past 7 years identified «around 2’000 robust associations with 
more than 300 complex diseases and traits» (Manolio, 2013, p. 549). 
These studies were designed to show the links existing between DNA 
and human traits and behaviours. However, as Manolio explained, the 
«initial euphoria […] has dimmed somewhat with the recognition that 
GWAS-defined loci explain only a very small proportion of different 
traits’ heritability, [and] they have met considerable skepticism regard-
ing their clinical applicability» (idem). Thus, we believe that this skepti-
cism may be explained by the blind alley of heritability. 
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More recently, software called genome-wide complex trait analysis 
(GCTA) was developed to deal with «missing heritability» (Yang et al., 
2011). However, as Turkheimer has put it on his blog: 
«GCTA is more like a twin study than it is like gene-finding. SNP arrays are used 
to define pairwise genomic similarity among ‘unrelated’ individuals, and then 
genomic similarity is compared to phenotypic similarity. So yes, the heritability 
that was detected via quantitative genetics exists down in the SNPs somewhere, 
but where else would it have been?»10. 
The final nail in behavioural genetics’ coffin is given by Charney (2012). 
He clearly shows that: 
«The cumulative evidence of recent discoveries in genetics and epigenetics calls 
into question the validity of two classes of methodologies that are central to the 
discipline [behaviour genetics]: twin, family, and adoption studies, which are 
used to derive heritability estimates, and gene association studies, which in-
clude both genome-wide and candidate-gene association studies» (p. 332). 
Charney’s paper was followed by a very large number of peer commen-
taries from different social sciences, and by authors’ responses. Even 
though this shows an increasing agreement against the use of behav-
ioural genetics, a number of commentators remain convinced of the use-
fulness of behavioural genetic methods. 
We hope that we have shown clearly that behavioural genetics supposes 
the existence of more order and regularity in human heredity that it 
finds: additivity of effects, independence between environment and ge-
nes, randomness of the environment, etc. All these regularities are falla-
cious and a real scientific approach to this question may only be found 
while using the scientific results of molecular and genomic sciences.  
We will see later, in the part concerned with the Idols of the Theatre, 
that this attitude may be linked also to more political motivations with 
the notions of eugenics and hereditarianism. 
Idols of the Cave (Idola Specus) 
Let us now see how Bacon characterized this second kind of Idol. He 
proposed that the individual may construct an entire system, with refer-
ence to a few observations and ideas. He gave the example of chemists 
which «out of few experiments of the furnace, have built up a fantastic 
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philosophy, framed with reference to a few things» (Book One, LIV). 
More generally he presents those using these idols as follows: 
«There are found some minds given to an extreme admiration of antiquity, oth-
er to an extreme love and appetite for novelty; but few so duly tempered that 
they can hold the mean, neither carping at was had been well laid down by the 
ancient, nor despising what is well introduced by the moderns» (Book One, 
LVI). 
Such an appetite for novelty with reference to few things can be found 
nowadays in postmodern theory, which tries to reject any real scientific 
or objective approach, putting art, science and religion on an equal foot-
ing. Simultaneously, many perspectives from the past have re-emerged 
with new relevance, so that such an approach cumulates the appetite for 
novelty with the admiration of antiquity, such as Gnosticism and the 
major esoteric traditions. Postmodernism rejects all reference to a long 
tradition of scientific thinking which stays between antique and more 
recent ideas and considers everything as a social construction. 
Before looking more precisely at its application to demography, let us 
first see its more general applications trying to link the three aspects of 
human condition, as in the paper written by Latour: How to be icono-
philic in art, science and religion (1998). 
As long as postmodernism remained on an artistic basis (architecture, li-
terature, music) or on a religious one, it is out of our field. However, re-
cently Derrida, Jameson, Lacan, Lyotard, etc., introduced scientific terms 
in their arguments and even rejected true scientific thinking like the se-
cond way proposed by Bacon. Such an attitude makes them directly en-
ter in the field of this paper. For example, Latour (1998) said: 
«When science was obsessed by what happened in the Mind or what was the 
case in the World, the distance with arts, especially the visual arts, was at its 
maximum. But when science began to be seen as a mediating visual activity, 
then the visual arts offered a fabulous resource; they had always thought of 
themselves in terms of mediation and never bothered enormously about the 
representing Mind nor the represented World, which they took as useful but 
not substantial vanishing points» (p. 422). 
This view of scientific research introduces a construction of the mind 
that is ‘fallible and relative’, not only in art and religion, but also in sci-
ence, with only local beliefs being put in evidence. 
This approach inspired the notorious Sokal hoax, an article (1996) col-
lecting a number of the – in Sokal’s own words11 – «silliest quotations 
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[…] about mathematics and physics» from postmodernist authors, in an 
apparently serious paper. Sokal and Bricmont (1997) repudiate the idea 
that science amounts to social construction: 
«We show that famous intellectuals such as Lacan, Kristeva, Irigary, 
Baudrillard, and Deleuze have repeatedly abused scientific concepts and termi-
nology: either using scientific ideas totally out of context, without giving the 
slightest justification – note that we are not against extrapolating concepts 
made from one field to another, but only against extrapolations made without 
argument – or throwing around scientific jargon in front of their non-scientist 
readers without any regard for its relevance of even its meaning» (p. X). 
Even if such an attack raised important reactions of academics and the 
press, it did not stop the extension of postmodern theory in demograph-
ic literature. 
One of the first attempts to introduce this theory in demography is in 
van de Kaa’s (1998) paper, Postmodern fertility preferences: from chang-
ing value orientation to new behaviour. Van de Kaa recognizes that, the 
term “postmodern” has not been included in the demographic discourse 
before. In his view, the main reason for this rejection may be because of 
the elusive character of this concept. In view of a more serious use of it, 
he conceptualizes it as a world view (Weltanschauung) that he ascer-
tains by looking at a wide range of attitudes. He developed 11 scales of 
what he called «bourgeois» postmodernity, which cover such issues as 
«religiosity, requirements for a successful marriage, gender roles and 
socialization» (p. 21). According to van de Kaa, the group of people 
meeting the criteria of a «true» postmodernist is small but is higher for 
younger generations than for older, as expected. 
Then, van de Kaa tries to explore the relationship between the levels of 
«bourgeois» postmodernity in the industrial countries, measured by 
World Value Surveys, and the marital and fertility scores in the second 
demographic transition. A regression analysis of the postmodernity in-
dicator against the fertility scores suggests low correlation (R = 0.318, 
not significant), higher for the one against the marital scores (R = 0.548, 
significant). Needless to say, the usual caveat about correlation not im-
plying causal relationships remains in force. More detailed analysis, in 
particular using the near concept of postmaterialism12, most largely 
used in social sciences but less extensively than the concept of post-
modernism, led him to say: 
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«One could postulate here that, as the process of postmodernization continues, 
postmaterialists might find it easier to combine childbearing with other activi-
ties and might then be able to match or exceed the numbers of children born to 
materialists. However, as yet support for that pervasive thesis is not strong» 
(van de Kaa, 1998, p. 32). 
Finally, van de Kaa stated that, even if such an analysis did not lead for 
the moment to very clear results, a «clever way of anticipating develop-
ments probably is to envisage the options of the postmodern avant-gar-
de will dream up and select» (p. 36). 
In her comments to this paper, Bacharach (2001) wonders whether the 
need of a precise conceptualization for the concept of postmodernism is 
compatible with the essence of postmodern ideas and thoughts: 
«However, his [van de Kaa’s] attempt to operationalize even these limited 
meanings using extant survey data proves fraught with difficulty, and arguably 
transforms the idea of postmodernism into variables that would not be recog-
nized or accepted by postmodernists» (p. 332). 
Bacharach also stated that, as was shown in more detailed studies of at-
titudes towards family issues (Moors, Palomba, 1995), family values 
cannot be compared with postmodern values. This leads to more com-
plex tensions between the two sets of values that a postmodernist ap-
proach alone would not be able to answer. 
A more complete presentation of Demography in the age of the postmod-
ern was published a little later (2003) by Riley and McCarty. This vol-
ume takes a very short-sighted view of the history of demography dis-
tinguishing only two main periods: a modernist approach and a post-
modernist one. Even its authors think that postmodernism has rarely 
been used in the past and that demography was mainly remaining in the 
modern era.  
First, they appear to be unaware of 250 years of demographic thinking 
from Graunt (1662) to the early twentieth century with major thinkers 
in the domain such as Huygens, Euler, Laplace, etc. For them demogra-
phy is mainly a modern science born at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry and remaining in great demand by a wide variety of clients, mainly 
political ones: 
«Because funding has been secure and because it has a ready market for the use 
of its findings, demography has had less reason to question the very nature and 
premises of the field itself» (Riley, McCarty, 2003, p. 82). 
Again, they seem to be unaware of the important changes in paradigm 
that occurred from the end of World War II: from a cross-sectional, to a 
cohort, to an event-history and to a multilevel paradigm (Courgeau, 
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2007). They mainly consider, this time with reason, the shortcomings of 
the demographic transition theory. 
Riley and McCarty (2003) do not clearly say that demography is now 
entering in the era of postmodernism but only «suggest that postmod-
ern perspectives have already entered the field of demography, even if 
they are not named as such» (p. 158). However their book is a defence 
for its larger use in demography and they present a number of examples 
of studies that they think perform particularly well in highlighting the 
usefulness of a postmodern approach. 
One of their points is «a move away from universal perspectives and a 
focus on the local» (Riley, McCarty, 2003, p. 120). However, an im-
portant movement towards detailed and local surveys has been present 
in demography for more than forty years. Examples include a survey on 
local networks in a French commune (Courgeau, 1972) or a detailed 
survey about demographic, professional and migratory experiences 
(Courgeau, 1985). This interest, which gives «attention to inequalities 
and their influences», does not simultaneously put aside a «focus on 
better or exact measurement» (Riley, McCarty, idem). 
Finally, the definition of Lyotard (1979, 1984), describing postmodern-
ism as «incredulity about metanarratives» (passim), which has already 
been criticized by Sokal (1996) from the point of view of physics, seems 
to us similarly open to criticism from social sciences. It is sufficient in 
our opinion to oppose this incredulity to the progress of social sciences 
and demography in recent years. 
We will conclude this part by saying that the Idols of the cave, always 
running against demography, did not give rise to an important post-
modern movement in these sciences, but only some wavelets which did 
not reach its core. 
Idols of the Market Place (Idola fori) 
For Bacon, these idols are «formed by the intercourse and association of 
men with each other» (Book One, XLIII). He said about them: 
«But the Idols of the Market Place are the most troublesome of all – idols which 
have crept into the understanding through the alliance of words and names. For 
men believe that their reason governs the world; but it is also true that words 
react on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the 
sciences sophistical and inactive» (Book One, LIX). 
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He gave different examples of such idols as they were at his time, but did 
not include in them political scientific debates that have now become 
much more important than in Bacon’s times, when political power was 
largely in the hands of absolute monarchs.  
The political debates of the present day also use «names of things which 
do not exist, or… exist, but yet confused and ill defined, and hastily and 
irregularly derived from realities» (Book One, LX). The political motiva-
tion is their main purpose, «formed by the intercourse and association 
of men» (Book One, XLIII), and it is sustained by false claims of scientific 
validity. 
The example we will treat here is eugenics, now referred to as heredita-
rianism, which is often associated with behavioural genetics, but is 
mainly a political tool. As for postmodernism, we will first develop its 
main general aims, before looking in more detail its approach to the de-
mographic field. 
Though it was already present in the work of Galton from his book on 
Hereditary genius (1869), he fully introduced this concept in 1883 under 
the denomination of ‘eugenics’, and this was very influential in the early 
20th century. It has been clearly defined by Galton in 1904 as: 
«Eugenics is the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn 
qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage» 
(p. 1). 
From this definition, Galton considers eugenics a science. Such a science 
however introduces another concept: improving the qualities of the 
race. 
Even though Darwin, Galton’s half-cousin, agreed in principle that intel-
lectual activity can be inherited, he was not entirely in agreement with 
Galton’s ideas on eugenics. He wrote to him in January 1873 about the 
eugenic register he was promoting (cited after: Galton, Galton 1998, 
p. 100): 
«… the greatest difficulty I think would be in deciding who deserved to be on 
the register. How few are above mediocrity in health, strength, morals and in-
tellect; and how difficult to judge on these latter heads». 
Still, Galton did indeed «draw up a tentative scale of how to estimate the 
‘worth’ of persons, corresponding to the virtues and values of Victorian 
England» (idem), based mainly on the predominant political views of 
the time. The scale was largely based on the combination of social class 
and «merit», with the highest rank given to «Ministers of State, Heads of 
Departments, Bishops, Judges, Commanders and Admirals in Chief, Gov-
ernors of Colonies and other appointments» (idem). 
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As further noted by Galton and Galton (1998), these ideas were followed 
up in various countries: already by 1931, sterilization laws had been 
adopted in 27 states in the US. During the Nazi period in Germany, be-
tween 1933 and 1945, German biologists, anthropologists and geneti-
cists actively invoked eugenic principles to justify Nazi racial policies 
(idem). Later, the label ‘eugenics’ was rejected after the end of World 
War II, having become associated with Nazi Germany, and was replaced 
by «hereditarianism», a more neutral term, which encompassed many of 
the eugenicist ideas. 
We will show now how these principles were applied in a great number 
of so-called demographic studies. 
It is very interesting to note that Galton (1873) undertook the first sys-
tematic demographic study of differential fertility, using extracts from 
census returns about «1’000 ‘families’ of factory hands at Coventry 
[and] 1’000 families of agricultural labourers in rural parishes of War-
wickshire» (idem, pp. 20-21). His purpose was to show that: 
«… those whose breed is the most valuable to our nation are attracted from the 
country to our towns. If, then, residence in towns seriously interferes with the 
maintenance of their race, we should expect the breed of Englishmen, so far as 
that influence is concerned, to steadily deteriorate» (p. 19). 
He found that «the rate of supply in towns to the next adult generation is 
only 77 percent, or, say three quarters of that in the country» (idem), 
showing that his fear is verified. However, if his study showed a lower 
fertility of «artisan townsfolk» compared with «labouring people who 
live in healthy country districts» (idem, p. 23), this did not mean that the 
English «race» deteriorated, as Galton pretended. 
A detailed study from Soloway (1990) during the beginning of the 20th 
century shows clearly the link between fertility and the question of 
«race quality»: 
«Inverse correlations between fertility and social status focused public atten-
tion upon the highly subjective and emotional question of ‘race quality’ and 
provoked alarming predictions that Britain would also be swamped by the so-
cially and, if eugenicists were correct, genetically ‘unfit’» (p. XI). 
This prospect of «race suicide» was feared in all European and North 
American countries and a number of demographic studies at the time 
were very often linked to eugenics. 
In his paper on links between eugenics and interwar demography, 
Ramsden (2003) highlights the connections existing between the Inter-
national Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems 
(IUSIPP), founded in 1928, renamed in 1947 as the International Union 
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for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), and the eugenic groups. 
The eugenicists’ influence was great at the time when IUSIPP was found-
ed. The Union’s first president, the American biologist Pearl, even 
though he emphasized science over policy, tended to promote his own 
approach. As noted by Ramsden (2003): 
«Pearl was determined to establish a biometric approach to population study 
and eugenics – an approach that had been lacking in the United States, given 
American eugenicists’ predilections for a simplistic interpretation of Mendelian 
theory» (p. 554). 
This approach was also followed by Corrado Gini, president of Italy’s 
Central Statistical Institute and vice-president of the IUSIPP, who was 
supportive of Mussolini’s Fascist regime (idem). The next IUSIPP confe-
rence, held in Berlin in 1935, was also highly controversial, as there 
«German biologists promoted extreme theories and programs of racial 
hygiene» (Ramsden, 2003, p. 557). This happened despite Anglo-
American attempts to create an alternative through establishing a paral-
lel conference in London (Hodgson, 2001, p. 3’495). 
The following conference which was held at Paris in 1937 promoted a 
more social demography over the biological. According to Ramsden 
(2003): 
«… all papers that included elements of Nazi radical doctrine were placed in a 
section with a paper by Franz Boas [1938], who argued that the ‘naïve classifi-
cation’ of racial types was based not on scientific principles but on ‘subjective 
attitudes’» (p. 557). 
However, a new form of eugenics was promoted during this conference 
as social eugenics, term already used by Lorimer and Osborn (1934), and 
presented here by Osborn (1938). He agreed with Boas that differences 
in intelligence were in part determined by environment but as Ramsden 
(2003) says: 
«Yet the measurement of intelligence was still relevant to the quality of indi-
viduals within the same groups, given the similarity of environmental influ-
ences on such individuals» (p. 558). 
Such an attitude replaced the «propagandist eugenics» of the Thirties, 
during the post-war period. John Caldwell (1996) is quoted by Ramsden 
(2003), as having clearly explained how postwar demographers: 
«… fought shy of the grander theory, and usually kept out of such battlegrounds 
as were offered by sociobiology, denying the element of eugenics in their past, 
and demanding ideas that promised the possibility of quantitative justification» 
(p. 329). 
However, as previously said, social eugenics was now promoted by for-
mer American eugenicists, even though the eugenicist position was no 
Daniel Courgeau, Jakub Bijak, Robert Franck, Eric Silverman 
 
45 
longer mentioned explicitly. As Osborn already wrote in 1968; «Eugenic 
goals are most likely to be attained under a name other than eugenics» 
(p. 104). 
For example, according to Ramsden (2003), Frederick Osborn, a well-
known promoter of eugenics in the previous pre-war period, co-founded 
the Population Council with John D. Rockefeller III in 1953, and was its 
president during the period 1957–1959: 
«Osborn ensured that the Council supported limited research and training pro-
grams in the problems of ‘population quality’, first in medical genetics in the 
1950s and then in population genetics in the 60s» (Ramsden, 2003, p. 579). 
As discussed by Connelly (2006), the early 1950s also marked the foun-
dation of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) in 
1952, with Margaret Sanger as its first president – herself a supporter of 
eugenicist ideas. According to Connelly, Blacker, who later became ad-
ministrative chairman of the IPPF: 
«… worked with Osborn and won broad support for the goal of introducing 
‘family planning’ to ‘those who need it most’. This formulation elided the ques-
tion whether the need was felt by the individuals themselves or by those who 
knew better – that is, the critical question of who would actually do the plan-
ning in ‘family planning’» (Connelly, 2006, p. 221). 
Later on, Salas, who was appointed the director of the UNFPA, acted 
without presenting its principles and procedures to the Economic and 
Social Council13, consulting only countries favouring population control. 
In Connelly’s words, this movement seems to have accomplished its goal 
«without having to answer to anyone in particular» (2006, p. 202). 
To reach its political goals, the movement also used the methodology 
already presented in the first part of this paper: heritability analysis, 
and in particular research on IQ14. For example, Jensen (1969) estimated 
h² of IQ as 0.6 and H² as 0.8 to argue against the Head Start Programme 
for Black children in the USA. This permitted him to claim that as IQ has 
a high genetic component and is highly correlated with educational at-
tainment, the programme would not result in higher achievement by 
Black children and money was being wasted. In the book The Bell Curve, 
Herrnstein and Murray (1994) argued that assortative mating and high 
heritabilities would lead to the emergence of a «cognitive elite». Lower 
                                                 
13. It is interesting to see how Sauvy (1969) pointed out that UNFPA «would act in 
the name of the United Nations without having to answer to them, free to dispense money 
to pharmaceutical companies and family planning associations» (Connelly, 2006, p. 228). 
14. The argument in this section is taken from Vetta and Courgeau (2003). 
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estimates of h² and H² of IQ at 0.36 and 0.48 obtained by Devlin et al. 
(1997) led McGue (1997) to state that: 
«Devlin and colleagues’ findings will lead to a reconsideration of the dire con-
clusions from the Bell Curve» (p. 417). 
Still, even if IQ were indeed a genetic trait, the conclusions would not 
change: the lower estimates would merely impact the timing of the pro-
cess. 
Molecular genetics and genomics enabled further studies showing asso-
ciation between IQ and many single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
(Payton, 2009). However, more recent genome-wide association studies 
show that, as the title of the paper by Chabris et al. (2012) says: «Most 
reported genetic associations with general intelligence are probably 
false positives». As discussed in the next section, the legacy of Fisherian 
statistical inference and allowing, by convention, relatively high proba-
bility associated with false positives (e.g. 0.05), does not help. Chabris et 
al., (2012) conclude their study by saying: 
«Our results add IQ to the list of phenotypes that must be approached with 
great caution when evaluating published molecular genetic associations. In our 
view, excitement over the value of behavioral and molecular genetic studies in 
the social sciences should be tempered – as it had been in the medical sciences 
– by an appreciation that for complex phenotypes, individual common genetic 
variants of the sort assayed by SNP microarrays are likely to have very small ef-
fects» (p. 1’321). 
The hope to find a clear signification to the heritability of IQ, with asso-
ciated genes, may again be explained by the blind alley of heritability. 
The use of GCTA techniques, mentioned in the section on the Idols of the 
Tribe, will not solve the problem either. As Turkheimer said on his 
blog15: 
«If we were start a program tomorrow to take SNPs from newborns and predict 
their intelligence, we would do so at a level much worse than predicting from 
the parent’s income, for example, never mind from their IQ». 
As there are a very great number of other characteristics from the par-
ents and from education given to the children that have great influence 
on their adult’s IQ, the use of heritability or GCTA methods alone is not 
scientifically valid. 
Eugenics and hereditarianism are always deeply anchored in present 
political thought, and to reject them with scientific arguments seems ve-
                                                 
15. Quoted after: http://ericturkheimer.blogspot.fr, entry from 13 February 2013 
(as of 1/04/2014). 
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ry difficult and even ineffective. Still, we argue that contemporary demo-
graphy needs to make this effort – and be more aware of the false posi-
tives, which go undetected by the most commonly used statistical ritu-
als – in order to steer clear from potentially very dangerous ideas that 
lack any scientific foundations. 
Idols of the Theatre (Idola Theatri) 
The last kind of Baconian idol has «immigrated into men’s minds from 
the various dogmas of philosophies and also from wrong laws of de-
monstration» (Book One, XLIV). He characterizes them more precisely: 
«But the Idols of the Theater are not innate, nor do they steal into the under-
standing secretly, but are plainly impressed and received into the mind from 
the playbooks of philosophical systems and the perverted rules of demonstra-
tion» (Book one, LVI). 
He gave many examples of such idols coming from philosophy, religion 
and theology and showed that: 
«There is taken from the material of philosophy either a great deal out of a few 
things, or a very little out of many things; so that on both sides philosophy16 is 
based on too narrow a foundation of experiment and natural history, an decides 
on the authority of too few cases» (Book one, LXII). 
More recently such an approach based on a few cases of observations 
was developed corresponding to modern hermeneutics (the traditional 
hermeneutics, predominantly theological, is «the study of the methodo-
logical principles of interpretation»17). This last form is what we will 
present and criticize here, first in its general application to social scienc-
es and then in its application to demography18. 
The modern hermeneutic approach was first introduced by Dilthey 
(1883), who made a distinction between comprehension (Verstehen) 
and explanation (Erklären). He recognizes that the natural sciences may 
                                                 
16. At the time of Bacon philosophy was a synonymous to science. 
17. Merriam-Webster dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
hermeneutics (as of 7/04/2014). 
18. We want to stress here that we do not reject qualitative evidence in general: on 
the contrary, we think it has its valid place in scientific enquiry through providing con-
text, information about underlying causal mechanisms, relationships between variables, 
knowledge a priori, etc. We argue, however, that this information should be – as any 
other – subjected to the rigours of the scientific method in order to lead to valid conclu-
sions. 
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be only explicative, while the social sciences need a more comprehen-
sive approach. However, he never said that social sciences may be with-
out explanation (Franck, 1994). 
As argued by Kleining and Witt (2001), «the second impact of herme-
neutics upon the social sciences occurred during the last third of the 
twentieth century» (p. 2), with philosophers like Gadamer, Habermas, 
Heidegger and Ricœur, and social scientists like the historian Skinner or 
the sociologist Giddens. Even though these authors may have some dif-
ferent points of view on hermeneutics, they all agree that: 
«The next move a number of analytical philosophers have thus been prompted 
to make is to appeal directly to the tradition of hermeneutics, as revived by Ga-
damer, Ricœur, and especially Habermas, and to argue for more interpretative 
model of the natural, as well as the human sciences» (Skinner, 1975, p. 209). 
Here Skinner posits that there are no universal truths in the sphere of 
natural and social sciences. Every situation is unique and should be 
viewed in its specific context to be properly understood. Similarly, Gad-
amer (1960) suggests that the Baconian idols are not distorting influ-
ences on our judgement, but are features of our experience that are ir-
reducible to their teleological aspects, related to the questions of sense 
or purpose. These idols or prejudices (judgments made before the final 
examination of all moments that determine a thing), as Gadamer called 
them, are rejected by science, but are central to hermeneutic experience. 
For a more detailed view on this theory, which is only briefly presented 
here, the book edited by Skinner on The return of grand theory in the 
human sciences (1985) will be a good reference.  
However, even if this theory has been greeted positively by many re-
viewers and authors in different fields, it raises a number of general 
problems which overstep the differences between authors. We will not 
consider here the more philosophical problems of hermeneutics, but 
mainly those pertaining more generally to an hermeneutic view of social 
science and then to demography more specifically. 
First, as hermeneutists do not recognize any value in the usual methods 
of social sciences, and even say they have no methods of their own for 
human sciences19 (Gadamer, 1960), they are unable to provide any gui-
dance for the actual practice of the social sciences. In Gadamer’s view, 
hermeneutics is not a prescriptive methodology, nor an epistemology, 
but rather an ontology (see also Mendelson, 1994), which is at first ap-
                                                 
19. They often made a distinction between human sciences or humanities (philolo-
gy, literary criticism, aesthetics, cultural history, etc.) and the other social sciences. 
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proximation a study of what exists. This turns out to be a philosophical 
problem and as we said previously we will not consider it in this paper. 
However, Gadamer for example: 
«… characterizes science as a mere ‘amassing’ of ‘verified knowledge’, whereas 
the human sciences deal with an entirely different dimension of human experi-
ence, the realm of truth» (Applebaum, 2011, p. 8). 
He seems to have a very partial view of scientific research and does not 
offer a reflection on how in practice social or human research could be 
effectively conducted. 
A second problem lies in the fact that hermeneutists consider that stud-
ied facts may be explained only by the particular ideas in vogue during a 
short period of time around their arrival. As Femia (1981) wrote about 
Skinner: 
«[He] writes of the history of political thought as if it were merely a series of 
disconnected intellectual events. But if every historical utterance and action is a 
unique event, historical inquiry itself becomes impossible. The historian must, 
unavoidably, pursue analogies, make comparisons, identify regularities, and use 
general concepts. If all historical events are sui generis, then we cannot write 
history; we can only pile up documents» (p. 127). 
For the hermeneutist, every fact – like every text – is unique and should 
be viewed in its specific context in order to be properly understood. 
Such an absence of connections between events occurring in different 
periods of time is at the core of hermeneutic thinking, and simultane-
ously cuts any links existing between events occurring in different ti-
mes. This is not only true for history, but for every social science, for 
which different paradigms may have been created at different times in 
the past and are still used in the present. In this case there is no possibil-
ity, according to the hermeneutic perspective, of linking these approa-
ches. 
Another problem lies in the fact that written texts, which hermeneutists 
mainly consider, are from so many different authors and so often con-
tradict each other that we may wonder how any real scientific result 
could be extracted from them. Even Skinner’s seminal 1969 article on 
Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas was originally titled 
The unimportance of the great texts, a formulation which corresponds 
with the disrespectful aura of this article (Åsard, 1987). So, the main 
interest of the hermeneutists «should not be to explain, but only in the 
fullest detail to describe» (Skinner, 1966, p. 214). 
Rather than continue this general criticism of hermeneutics, we will go 
now to its application to population science and demographic problems. 
Recently, Charbit (2010) has presented the emergence of population 
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sciences following Skinner’s approach. His work concentrates on con-
textualizing the texts he examined, taking into account different dimen-
sions of each author’s thought, such as population doctrine, political 
philosophy or economic theory. But he remains always entrenched in 
the period of time in which these authors lived, assuming that the links 
between different authors living in different periods of time are not real-
ly useful for the detailed understanding of a given author. As Morley 
(2012) said: 
«Charbit could usefully have focused more on the tradition of the reception of 
those writers, the role of their ideas in later debates even if interpreted in 
anachronistic and dubious ways, but his chosen approach of thorough-going 
contextualism closes off that possibility» (p. 347). 
Charbit did not cross-examine the authors he studies enough to be able 
to give an original and new approach in the history of demographic ide-
as. For example, he was not able to understand the originality of 
Graunt’s approach, only saying that he was using a «shop-Arithmetic», 
whereas he should have connected his thought to the general approach 
of science proposed by Bacon fifty year before, to the Bayesian approach 
of population problems by Laplace more than a century later and to the 
development of demography during the last one hundred years (Cour-
geau, 2013). 
Similarly, a number of demographers consider that the usual approach 
of population problems is not sufficiently contextualized, and too analyt-
ical. While the former may be true in some cases, Petit and Charbit’s 
(2012) charge against the so-called French school, which is in fact the 
usual scientific practice of demography in every country of the world 
since Graunt, develops a hermeneutic proposal. 
First, we find here the main hermeneutic theme that the social sciences, 
contrary to the natural sciences, do not need an explanative approach 
but only a comprehensive one. Petit and Charbit stated: 
«That the social sciences, as though affected by a nagging inferiority complex, 
continually seek to justify themselves in relation to natural sciences – and, 
more especially, of a belief in the supremacy of causality and determinism» 
(p. 330). 
It seems surprising that the authors describe the social sciences as 
linked so closely to causality and determinism. From a long time now 
probability – mainly subjective as given by Bayes, but also objective as 
defined by Pascal – has been at the core of these sciences, and provides a 
rigorous language with which to talk about chance and which is also 
often opposed to causality. We will not discuss further here the use of 
these terms as that may lead to a more philosophical argument, but we 
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think that with respect to contemporary demography these criticisms 
are misplaced. 
Second, Petit and Charbit (2012) think that each society, even each so-
cial group within the same population, needs to be treated separately. 
The uniqueness of each text is replaced in the population field by the 
uniqueness of each considered group. They state that: «the reductive 
approach to social complexity implied by demography entail an espe-
cially stark disembodiment of reality» (p. 328). In this case, no generali-
zation of their approach is possible and each study is confined into its 
own particularism. As observed by Little, (2008, p. 8), «it may appear 
that interpretations are self-confirming – an unhappy conclusion if we 
think that social explanations ought to have rational justification and 
empirical support». 
Third, Petit and Charbit (2012) seem to neglect that the methods they 
criticize – by saying that «demography subsequently became increasing-
ly sophisticated (and therefore increasingly withdrawn and isolated)» 
(p. 331) – have allowed demographers to invent new forms of analysis 
as required by their research objectives. For example, event history 
analysis allows us to analyse clinical trials in a new way on a small num-
ber of patients in order to save a great number of human lives (Ander-
sen et al., 1993; Aalen et al., 2008). 
Finally, Petit and Charbit (2012) suggest that a rapprochement of disci-
plines such as demography, economics, quantitative sociology, human 
geography, anthropology, history and more comprehensive forms of so-
ciology is possible under an interdisciplinary area of research. As Gada-
mer wanted full and permanent cooperation between humanities, they 
wanted the same between social sciences. As appealing as it may sound, 
such a concept seems utopian and somewhat difficult to attain, as the 
fields of these social sciences are so different, going from statistical rea-
soning to historical contextualization. It seems to us, on the contrary, 
that we demographers have «to resist the temptation to spread our-
selves too thinly; we must strive, on the contrary, to focus our research 
on the specific object of demography» (Courgeau, Franck, 2007, p. 39). 
Hermeneutics is obviously not the only possible demographic Idol of the 
Theatre. Related problems can be seen also in attempts to uncritically 
transfer other tools specific to qualitative research – for example Gla-
ser’s and Strauss’s (1967) «grounded theory» – to more quantitative 
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fields of study, such as demography20. Here, one of the main problems is 
that in a scientific study of population-wide phenomena drawing con-
clusions on the basis of non-representative information will be almost 
surely biased. 
Statistical methods have their challenges too. In particular, the problem 
of false positives in demography – incorrectly detecting patterns where 
there are none – may be widespread, predominantly owing to the prolif-
eration of surveys and survey-based studies. Fisher’s legacy in statistics 
is partly to blame as well. Not only does it entirely ignore the Type II er-
rors associated with false negatives (missing the true patterns), but also 
has indirectly led to allowing, by mere convention, a relatively high pro-
bability of Type I errors associated with false positives (e.g. 0.05). In this 
context, Gigerenzer (2008) painted a picture of a «null ritual», whereby 
hypotheses are specified ex post after the statistical analysis has been 
conducted, and the reporting of p-values usually is limited to whether 
they are smaller than some threshold level, such as 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01. 
Fisherian inference, as opposed to the logicist or subjectivist (Bayesian) 
ones, the last one based on explicitly-defined prior beliefs, allows testing 
the probability of obtaining a given sample assuming that the hypothe-
sis is true, but does not tell anything about the probability of the hypo-
thesis. Unfortunately, through wide adoption of the «null ritual» to ana-
lysing survey-based information, demography may be exposed to the 
problem of false positives and false negatives. Especially in the era of 
«big data», automated data mining techniques – if used uncritically in 
conjunction with the «null ritual» and without following the necessary 
validation and calibration procedures – can easily lead to false discover-
ies21. 
Conclusions 
The greatest successes of demography, and its most prominent areas of 
practical application for the public good, involve population-level statis-
tical analysis and forecasting. The use of the inductive scientific method, 
                                                 
20. The authors are very grateful to a reviewer of The Quetelet Journal for drawing 
our attention to these issues. See also the following blog entry by Liili Abuladze: 
http://demotrends.wordpress.com/2013/06/24/a-case-for-quantitative-methods-in-
demography (as of 24/04/2014). 
21. For a statistical discussion of data mining and problems with the associated 
true confidence levels, see e.g. Charemza and Deadman (1997).  
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initiated four centuries ago by Bacon, is the best way to achieve this. As 
noted by Russell (1912): «we must either accept the inductive principle 
on the ground of its intrinsic evidence, or forgo all justification of our 
expectations about the future» (p. 106). On the other hand, some de-
mographers may be tempted to enrich demographic analysis by insights 
from arts, humanities and the world of politics, in order to deepen our 
understanding, aid explanation, increase societal relevance and help 
engage with the subject of the study: human populations and how they 
change.  
In our view, the main challenge is to resist the Baconian idols – i.e. any 
biases and prejudices – in population analysis, and to keep sight of the 
main source of the «paradigmatic success» of demography (Morgan, 
Lynch, 2001), which is its empirical, scientific character. This does 
not imply that population sciences should become a complacent ivory 
tower or that we should not allow additional insights, influences and 
inspirations, insofar these are constantly submitted to the rigours of the 
inductive method as proposed by Bacon. 
The overarching question remains: under which conditions can addi-
tional insights, influences and inspirations enrich the scientific study of 
human populations? These conditions consist, in our opinion, of contin-
uously confronting new insights with the gathering of secure, relevant 
facts. 
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